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This research studies the process of bilateral negotiations between the Argentine and British governments about the dispute over the sovereignty of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands from 1983 to 1989.
In this period, the relationship between both governments evolved from rupture and no-relations after the war of 1982 to the agreement on the conditions to negotiate the renewal of full diplomatic relations concluded in early 1990. In this process of prenegotiation, the United States played a pivotal role in helping to reach an agreement. During the period of prenegotiation Argentina moderated its original position and accepted the British conditions to start negotiations.
This work seeks to elucidate how the intervention of a powerful and committed third-party, the United States government, persuaded Argentina and Great Britain to get to the table. 1 By concentrating upon the decisions of the Argentine government, we will analyze the effect of the presence of a thirdparty at two different moments when Argentina decided to explore the initiation of negotiations with Great Britain. In one instance negotiations failed. In the other the outcome was successful, a potential crisis was solved, and the road was clear for starting serious negotiations. In this last instance, what factor changed to compel the Argentine government to come to the table and accept the British terms, while in the previous case they had failed to do so? This paper contends that it was the presence of an effective third-party.
In general the literature on international negotiation stresses how the parties negotiate, but another important albeit less studied problem is that of persuading the parties to negotiate. 2 In 1982, the Argentine military government launched a military operation to repossess the British colonial territory of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands. In a war that lasted 74 days, the British defeated the Argentine troops, and regained the territory. After this adverse result, the Argentine military regime collapsed, and in December 1983 a new democratically elected government assumed power. The new government of the President Raúl Alfonsín maintained its claims over the islands, although it rejected the use of force to solve the dispute. At this stage, both governments expressed their desire to reestablish complete diplomatic relations. All efforts to negotiate the issue failed because the positions of the two parties remained far apart. In effect, after winning the war, the British wanted only to restore formal diplomatic relations without discussing the issue of sovereignty. For its part, the Argentine government proposed formal diplomatic relations only if sovereignty were part of the package to be discussed at the table. During this period, initiatives to negotiate bilaterally failed. In July 1984, the Swiss government sponsored talks in the city of Berne that failed.
The situation finally began to change after a crisis in 1986. This crisis was sparked by differences between Argentina and Great Britain over the control of fishing in the disputed waters. First, the Argentine implemented a policy of more aggressive naval patrolling in the waters around the islands and it signed fishing agreements with the Soviet Union and Bulgaria. The British thereupon imposed unilaterally a fishing conservation zone in the area. The implementation of these policies appeared to escalate the dispute into a potentially new conflict in the South Atlantic. At that moment, the United
States, worried about the tension between two of its allies, intervened as a mediator. After two years of secret prenegotiations among the three parties, the Argentine government agreed to negotiate formally the reinstatement of diplomatic relations without discussing for the moment the issue of sovereignty over the islands as were the British wishes. During this period, the trilateral negotiations had changed the Argentine position from negotiating only if discussing sovereignty to the reestablishment of diplomatic relations without discussing sovereignty. Why did the Argentine government take such decision? What factors influenced the decision to adopt a conciliatory approach?
This paper contends that between 1986 and 1989, parties established a "zone of agreement"
where they had failed previously, primarily because of the presence of a mediating party like the United
States. 3 The resolution of any dispute depends on recognizing a settlement range consisting of all the possible settlements which both sides might prefer to no agreement at all. A preliminary task of the negotiators is to explore the possibility of finding such zone. For this reason recent literature has begun to pay more attention to the preliminary stage or phase in the negotiation process known as prenegotiation (PN). 4 The parties engage in PN because they agree that the search for a resolution is better than stalemate or the status quo. As Zartman and Berman explain, "long before the first formal session opens, the negotiation process begins with the decision made by each party to explore the possibility of negotiating." 5 One advantage of PN is that it is less structured, and less regulated by rules, than is formal negotiation. It allows more freedom to the parties and in consequence it is open-ended and fluid. PN is important in defining and narrowing the boundaries of the dispute, setting the agenda by eliminating many of the most problematic issues, identifying trade-offs, and structuring the agenda of formal negotiations. 6 Among the factors that explain prenegotiation outcomes, some authors concentrate on the importance of the mediation role by an effective third-party. 7 Structural realism assumes that states occasionally quarrel because they exist in an anarchic system without any central authority. 8 Conversely, lesser powers might not fight if a great power functions as a "policeman." We will argue that this idea is related to the notion of the presence of a mediator with leverage in the PN process. This suggests the crucial role played by the United States in the dispute between Great Britain and Argentina.
Mediation is a form of third party intervention in disputes for the purpose of abating or resolving that dispute through negotiation. The parties accept mediation in the hope that negotiation through an intermediary will help them reduce some of the risks that compromises entail, by protecting their image and reputation when making concessions. Finally, a mediator's involvement may include a guarantee for the eventual agreement, thus reducing the risks of violation either adversary. 9 Through mediation, the mediator transforms the bargaining structure from a dyad into a triangle.
In a triangular relationship, the outcome of the contest may be determined by the transformation of a coalition of two against one. 10 This could apply to the Argentine case when its negotiators confronted the essentially unified position of the United States and Great Britain during the period of the secret negotiations. One important claim of the literature on mediation is that the adversaries accept mediators because of their ability to influence, protect, or extend the interests of each party in conflict. In consequence, effective mediation is more a matter of leverage and influence than a matter of impartiality.
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This study examines the negotiation process primarily from the perspective of the Argentine government during the period 1982-1989 by using official documents and interviews to actors and witnesses of the events.
Direct Bilateral Negotiations: the road to Berne (January -July of 1984)
On December 10, 1983 a significant change took place in Argentina. A democratically elected government assumed power in the country. New actors took charge of Argentine politics. Consequently, some expected also a change in the future of the Anglo-Argentine negotiations. Observers expected that this change would help to improve the bilateral relationships. The new Argentine president, Raúl
Alfonsín, belonging to the Union Civic Radical, would be the president for next six years. In his inaugural speech to the Congress he declared that,
In the case of the Islands Malvinas, Georgia of the South and Sandwich of the South, it is and it will always be our unrelinquished objective the recovery and definitive secure of the right from our nation to its sovereign territorial integrity. In this point we are inflexible and the sovereignty is a previous fact to the negotiation. We will impel the recovery of those insular territories and their definitive integration to the sovereignty of the Nation claiming with energy and decision the execution of the effective resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations. They exhort to the direct negotiation of all the aspects. 12 Newspapers of that date also printed the message that Mrs. Thatcher, British Prime Minister, sent to the new president to congratulate him for assuming the presidency, At times of their government's beginning I want to make you know that, although we have many differences, we all can congratulate ourselves for the restoration of the democracy in Argentina, in the belief that it will bring freedom and justice to all its people. That day gives hopes for your country.
In a press communiqué, Alfonsin thanked Mrs. Thatcher for the good wishes. 13 In an interview with the British press, Alfonsín declared that a British reduction of the exclusion area in the waters surrounding the Malvinas and the suspension of the construction works of the new airport nearby Port Stanley could be followed by an Argentine decision for an immediate formal 6 suspension of the state of hostility. 14 He also added that in the subsequent negotiations "the islands could be immediately given in leasing to Great Britain for one period to be determine." 15 President Alfonsín's government refused systematically to declare the cease of the hostilities.
However, unlike the previous military regime, the new president asserted that his government would not extend the situation of belligerency. The negotiating strategy that the radical government adopted was one "to bring the United Kingdom to the table of negotiations by means of the public denunciation of the situation in diverse international forums." 16 This action would be carried out mainly in the United Nations' General Assembly. It would also be appealed to the Organization of American States and to the Non-aligned Movement. As part of the Argentine strategy, Alfonsín affirmed that they also had planned to try to work with the opposition inside the British Parliament.
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By the end of 1983, the positions of both governments were still far apart. The British expert
Walter Little summarized the situation in this way:
[Then] the British were willing to discuss everything except the only thing that Argentina wanted. On the other hand, the Argentina was mainly interested in discussing the only topic that the British had declared not to be willing to talk about. Their proposal restricted the discussion topics to practical ones such as repatriation to the continent of the remains of the soldiers killed during the war, renewal of the commercial and financial links, and restoration of direct diplomatic contacts. 20 The British government took the next concrete step. On January 26, the Swiss embassy in Buenos Aires delivered to the Argentine government a proposal to reopen the talks about Malvinas. They offered to reestablish the bilateral relations, to arrange the repatriation of the bodies of the Argentine soldiers, but
did not mention at all the issue of sovereignty. On April 6, the British government responded that they were ready talk about reestablishing diplomatic relations but not ready to talk about sovereignty. They also suggested a meeting between diplomats of both countries would. 24 The Argentines responded on May 19, requesting more precision about the meaning of the contacts. 25 The Argentine note led to a deeper involvement of the Swiss government, specially its Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Edouard Brunner, who assumed a personal role as mediator. 26 Since Alfonsín's assumption to power, the Argentine and the British had maintained confidential exchanges through the countries representing the respective interests of each party, Switzerland and Brazil. These exchanges aimed to reach an acceptable formula for both parties ending with the normalization of the relationships. 27 Specifically, Edouard Brunner together with the help of the Brazilian ambassador in Switzerland, Geraldo
Silos, had been working on confidential negotiations to arrange a meeting between representatives of Argentina and Great Britain. The purpose of the meeting was to facilitate an informal exchange of ideas without a predetermined agenda. 28 At the end of the talks, the parties expected to produce a joint According to official Argentine sources, the practical solution was not to require official translations during the meetings. The formula was expressed originally in English. When the Argentines would require the treatment of the issue of sovereignty, the British representatives would respond that the United Kingdom was "not prepared" to treat the topic. In this case, the Spanish translation could be either that the British were actually "not prepared," or "not willing." Consequently, each party would give to the phrase the interpretation they wanted. For the Argentines, the United Kingdom was not prepared to discuss the topic, but they could do it later. Whereas the British interpretation of the formula could be that they are "not willing" to do it. Covered by this ambiguous formula both governments would continue with the treatment of other topics. 30 In this way, the formula was specifically designed in such an ambiguous form to protect the desires of each party. According to Mirré, through the mediation of the The meeting in Berne failed because of the mention of the topic of sovereignty. In this case, both sides ending accusing the other of having broke the previously agreed formula.
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A few days later, the Argentine press, citing Swiss sources, claimed the South American diplomats had been assured that the British would respond to the sovereignty issue with "the almost scripted" `not in a position' to discuss it. In that ca se, Argentine representatives would assume that sovereignty would not be excluded at all, and they would proceed with the discussion of other topics. But, the British gave a different answer. Their representatives stated precisely that they were "not prepa red" to discuss the topic, which had a meaning very different to that of the expected answer. 35 The British had insisting on an official simultaneous Spanish translation. Thus, their words had the meaning that they in fact wanted, that is, "they were not w illing to treat the topic". 36 Ambassador Ortiz de Rozas, a direct witness, told the author that the British delegate spoke first and declared that his government was not prepared to discuss sovereignty. Then, the British translator repeated in Spanish "no e stá dispuesto" (not willing). The amazed Argentine delegation asked for an explanation and Mr. Howe, head of the delegation, repeated in perfect Spanish: "what you have heard, we are not willing to discuss the topic."
Mr. Howe had lived in Argentina for some years and had studied in a very exclusive English high school near Buenos Aires. 37 The British government thereupon declared that the Argentine government "had suddenly broken off the conversations for not abiding to the convened formula". 38 The differences arose from the introduction of the simultaneous translation. Argentine sources verify that they had agreed that there would be no interpreters in the meeting. 39 Contrary, the British insist that there was no violation of the previously accepted rules. 40 The Secretary of Foreign Affairs declared to the Parliament that the delegates had acted according to the "fully agreed arrangement and clearly understood by the Argentine
The Swiss government recognized that the parties were further apart than they had imagined. This assertion supports García del Solar interpretation that the rules had not been rigorously set. Compounding it was the Swiss attitude, which were very eager to do splendidly. Mr. Brunner was not rigorous enough, as he should have been, to check the agreement with both parts.
Consequently, both parties went to the meeting convinced that the rules had been set differently.
Moreover, "both parties showed their unwillingness to solve the problem when it arose" 42 Contrary,
Ambassador Ortiz de Rozas thought that the meeting had been "well prepared" by the Swiss, but that Margareth Thatcher changed the negotiators' instructions. 43 What is clear is that the parties wanted to sit and talk, but they were not prepared to move from their original positions as demonstrated by the clear British statements and Argentine abrupt decision to abandon the talks. 44 The Swiss government was not successful because of his inexperience, wishful thinking, or because it simply lacked the means to compel the parties to continue the dialogue.
The Berne summit was important, however, because it was the first direct official contact between the parties and its failure pulled back to zero the work that had been done during the previous months. Finally, it made more difficult future negotiations. 45 The abrupt end to the Berne conversations Until that war, the South Atlantic had been a fishing area little exploited. But after the conflict, it began to attract numerous fishing and factories of diverse and distant nationalities. Also, the area remained one of the few ones that lacked fishing regulation. This continued until the British established the conservation area in February of 1987. 46 In October of 1986, the United Kingdom decided to establish the conservation area known as
Falkland Islands Interim Conservation and Administration Zone (FICZ).
To avoid potential confrontations, British authorities superimposed the conservation area with the protection area established in July of 1982 around the Malvinas. The British ordinance also demanded that any vessel wanting to fish in the FICZ had pay for a license, and Argentine ships and airplanes could not enter into the protection area without the British government's prior authorization. 47 The United Kingdom justified the unilateral October 1986 decision for three reasons. First, confronted with the threat to the balance of the fishing stocks, the British government had tried during the 18 previous months to get an international agreement under the auspices of the FAO to regulate fishing in the region. Second, the Argentine government had begun a policy that the British considered "aggressive patrolling" within 200 miles from the Malvinas. This policy reached its peak when an Argentine patrol vessel sank a Taiwanese fishing boat in May of 1986. Lastly, the Argentina had signed bilateral fishing agreements with Bulgaria and the USSR under which the ships of those flags could fish in the waters around the Malvinas in July of that year. 48 The signing of these agreements also caught the attention of the Americans. According to some critics, the Argentine government was spreading the Cold War in the South Atlantic. 49 The Argentine government opposed any multilateral agreement because it would mean "to admit the British competition in maritime spaces of its jurisdiction and to recognize the United Kingdom as riverside country." 50 As for the British unilateral declaration, Argentine claimed that the declaration did not respond to the terms of the Resolution 31/49 of the United Nations. 
Anglo-Argentine confidential talks on fisheries: the United States mediation (1986-1989)
When the British government announced that starting from February 1 st of 1987 it would impose a conservation area and fishing administration unilaterally (FICZ) in the adjacent waters to the Islands Malvinas, Argentina protested. Immediately, the United States government feared escalation in the tension between the two friend nations. Therefore it decided to assume a more active role in order to reach some agreement to avoid incidents in the South Atlantic.
This section will present the development of the negotiations using the Argentine minutes that recorded the whole process. In case of problems, the non-papers could be easily denied them. 56 It is important to note that these initially cautious contacts were possible, partly, because a genuine desire existed in both countries to avoid an even worse deterioration in their relationship. One day before the enforcement of the conservation area, the British transmitted through the American embassy in Buenos Aires their own first non-paper. 61 The document declared that the Argentine document of December 23 had been well received. They shared the objectives of preventing incidents and conserving fisheries within the context of the international law. They also guaranteed that they were prepared, "without prejudice on the topic of sovereignty, to work to reach both objectives," that During this meeting, the Argentines gave their government's second non -paper. This statement proposed, without affecting their respective positions about sovereignty, the creation of a temporary regime to coordinate the respective administrations of the fishing areas, to establish application procedures, and to define the area of application of the regime. As for the role of a third party, it defined the role as advising the parties, receiving their ideas and elaborating proposals to the temporary coordination regime. For this role, the Argentines insisted on the Secretary General. The Argentine proposal also asked for "the elimination of the area of 150 miles in the two aspects of conservation and protection."
The Argentines produce another initiative during their next encounter with American officials.
The meeting took place in New York in the headquarters of the United Nations on June 25. In the meeting participated, the Argentine foreign minister, Caputo proposed the text of an umbrella formula for the sovereignty. This one was based, with very small modifications, in the one that had facilitated the signing of the Communications Agreements between Argentina and Great Britain in 1971. 62 It also proposed a sequence of steps to facilitate a bilateral meeting followed by reciprocal gestures. The
Americans officials agreed to transmit the proposal to the British embassy, but they warned that the British probably would reject the reciprocal gestures.
On August 10, the British responded to the latest Argentine non-paper via Washington. The second British non-paper, dated August 7, expressed that His Majesty's government accepted the interest shown by the Argentine government in reaching an agreement on the conservation, prevention of incidents, and improvement of the relationship between both countries. At the same time, it emphasized that they were not prepared "to discuss sovereignty." Also, to avoid future misunderstanding they considered that a fishing agreement in the South West Atlantic was regulated by two regimens with separate jurisdictional laws that required coordination. Most importantly, the declaration of October 29, 1986 stood. It rejected the Argentine proposition of an open agenda and, once again, the elimination of the conservation zone.
Minister Caputo gave the Argentine reaction to the British proposal of August 10 on September 29 to Mr. Gelbard. Caputo stated that the British document seemed to him good: "it is the first time that there is a positive exchange."
On November 27 the British embassy in Washington gave the American government its third British non-paper. In response to some Argentine concerns, London made clear that it was "a matter of fact" that there existed two separate bodies of fishing regula tions in the South West Atlantic, the British and the Argentine. In regards discussing practical topics like fisheries, the British Government declared that they were convinced that progresses in those topics would help to reestablish the normal relations. On December 3, the Americans gave the British document to the Argentines.
On December 22, the Argentinean delegation gave Gelbard a new non-paper, its fourth, responding to the British. It stated: "Argentina accepts the terms of the umbrella of soverei gnty" that However, these signs of progress were threatened by a British decision. On February 12, 1988 the British government announced that it would carry out military maneuvers in the area of Malvinas.
The operation named "Fire Focus" generated agitation in the diplomatic circles, and it hastened the return to Buenos Aires of Mr. Gelbard who was touring Latin America. He met on February 16 with Caputo, who stated that the British action had ruined the favorable climate created for taking the "audacious initiative" of an Argentine declaration of cease of hostilities.
On the other hand, Gelbard thereupon answered that he had received the news with "consternation" and that he was upset by the suddenness of the British decision. He also affirmed that the Argentines had behaved well. Finally, he also declared:
We are very angry. They acted [the British] like in the case of the declaration of the Area of Conservation. We, in these last months have expressed to them our concern for the sale of weapons to Chile. They are destabilizing the Hemisphere. It is OUR hemisphere, not theirs. We are worried about what can happen. At the beginning of October, Caputo met with Shultz in New York and said that he was "prepared to begin any contact with the British, with or without witness, with the level and reserve that they wanted"
and he urged starting the talks. 68 The Secretary of State responded that he would emphasize in a personal telegram to Secretary Howe the good predisposition and the flexibility showed by the Argentines.
By the mid-December an important meeting took place in Geneva, between Foreign Minister
Caputo and the British representative in the United Nations, Crispin Tickell. Caputo, after clarifying that the meeting was not a negotiation, urged Tickell to begin conversations under the umbrella and open agenda. Tickell insisted on only limiting the talks to the prevention of incidents and fisheries conservation.
They talked about the British proposal that Argentina would accept the conservation area as a fact of life. Although the Argentines declared that they rejected the area, they understood that it existed in fact, and for this reason Argentines vessels did not enter the area. Tickell responded that what the British sought was recognition that the United Kingdom was there although it did "not mean that Argentina approves such a presence." 69 In this case, recognition signified that the Argentines did not attempt to enter into the area.
Caputo said that given the President Alfonsín's guarantees to Secretary Shultz (that Argentina would not introduce surprises and that it acted in good faith) and those expressed by him during the meeting, it would be enough to satisfy the required oral securities. Tickell responded that he found them sufficient, but they would have to be transmitted through the United States. Finally the parties agreed that the first meeting would be devoted to determining the agenda topics. , and "that is the answer that they had given us." That was the last exchange diplomat among the president's government Alfonsín and the British, by July of 1989, there was a new government in the Argentina.
Analysis of the Prenegotiation processes
Recently, the literature on international negotiations has begun to analyze more carefully the phase of prenegotiation. This study illuminates in more detail the development of this process and specifically, the role of the mediator in the case of the Anglo-argentine relations after fighting a war in
1982.
The course of any negotiation will be severely affected by how the principal parties can adjust their positions, set the agenda, and make arrangements to proceed with the formal negotiations. There are occasions during this process when the parties become deadlocked. Under such circumstances the intervention of a third party can introduce a new dynamic to the negotiation and push it beyond the point of stalemate. In these cases, the influence of the mediator became critical. This is precisely what happened in the complicated tango of the British-Argentine prenegotiations from 1982 to 1989.
As this study has shown, the Anglo-Argentine dispute over the sovereignty of the The failure of the talks at Berne in July 1984 shows that the parties had arrived at the formal meeting without enough preparations. There were profound disagreements between Argentina and the
United Kingdom regarding what topics were to be discussed. In this regard, observers agreed that the Swiss diplomats did not pay enough attention to the details in the preparation of the agenda. It was also clear that the British were determined to avoid any discussion on sovereignty even at the cost of breaking off negotiations before they could begin.
As a mediator in the PN process, Switzerland's intervention remained low on the spectrum, limiting itself to the role of "communicators" and only bela tedly as "formulators", in helping to shape the diplomatic formula of "not to be prepared" to discuss sovereignty at the formal meeting at Berne.
Although there is no doubt about Swiss impartiality and its tradition of neutrality and sincere interest in helping to resolve of the dispute, they were unable to modify the nature of the dispute and, because they lacked any other resource or leverage to offer to the principal parties, they could not keep them at the table.
Following the break-up in Berne official bilateral contacts between Argentina and the United Kingdom were frozen. But a new round of PN was triggered by another turning point in their relationship.
This time, the British had announced in October 29, 1986 , that a new Conservation and Protection Zone around the Falkland/Malvinas would be established in the next four months. This unilateral action generated a crisis atmosphere that soon prompted the Washington's diplomatic intervention. The United
States mediation continued for two years and ended in December 1988 when the British informed the American diplomats that they would await the results of the next presidential elections in Argentina before continuing with the next step, namely, a formal meeting between the parties to discuss a preestablished agenda that excluded the issue of sovereignty.
In contrast to the Swiss intervention, Argentina and the United Kingdom felt obliged to participate in the new diplomatic process sponsored by the United States at the end of 1986. As some scholars suggest, great powers, and the United States in particular, possess both the resources and the reputation to compel state leaders to return to the bargaining table. 70 In this case, the parties could not say no to great power mediation, given Washington's position in the international system and its capacity for acting as a guarantor of any possible agreement. 71 Acting as the Hemispheric "Godfather," Washington was making an offer that could not be refused. The United States had reasons and means to encourage the two parties to find a formula to communicate.
The Americans cleverly avoided any direct contact between the parties and proceeded with the PN through the exchange of non-papers that they would pass between the parties. Washington adopted an incremental strategy that skirted the controversial issue of sovereignty and sought to solve other issues first. Initially, during the first year of the mediation, the Americans stuck to a "communicator" role and rarely "formulated" alternative solutions. Finally, the parties arrived at an "umbrella formula" to preserve their respective claims over the territory in order to proceed to discuss other less controversial topics.
However, during 1988, American diplomats intensified their activity. They moved to the level of By the end of 1988, the Argentines declared that they were ready to have a formal meeting to discuss humanitarian and fishery conservation issues, and eventually, the reestablishment of formal diplomatic relations with the British under the terms of the umbrella formula.
The Argentines now were ready to sit at the table to discuss with a preset agenda that, most importantly, excluded any discussion of sovereignty. Nonetheless, the British suspended the negotiations to await the Argentine presidential elections scheduled for May 1989.
Unlike the first US diplomatic intervention in April 1982, which dealt with a crisis management situation, the 1986 intervention supports Stein and Zartman's assertions that PN is more useful and effective when is triggered by crisis avoidance or post-crisis management situations. However, according to Bercovitch and Wallensteen, success is a relative concept. In this case, instead of a categorical objective judgment of failure, the subjective criteria became all important. Consequently, it could be said that the Berne was a first test that educated the principal parties to become aware of the limits of their respective positions. It also helped to teach future mediators about how not to approach to the negotiation with the principal parties. Washington's meditation could also be a nalyzed according to the subjective dimensions of parties' satisfaction and effectiveness. Although parties' satisfaction measurement and precise meaning remain unclear, it is possible to get some sense of these satisfactions by looking at the objectives of the parties when they entered in the PN process and how much they were achieved at the end.
Washington's immediate objectives of avoiding a new confrontation in the South Atlantic were reached. The secondary objective of finding a way to have the parties seated to talk was also fulfilled.
The mediation process was the means to establishing future negotiating mechanisms between Buenos
Aires and London as they were finally adopted in the Madrid Accords. In this case, Washington's intervention not only maintained the parties at the table but also contributed to an educational process.
Finally, for the American diplomacy, in contrast with the role played during the conflict in 1982, the whole mediation process helped to improved Washington's image in the Hem isphere by working with the parties to reach some negotiated agreement.
From the Argentine perspective, the objective criteria of getting the British to discuss the transfer of sovereignty or, at least, a return to the ante-bellum situation of discussing a formula for sovereignty transfer, failed absolutely. However, if the measure of success is judgment about the extent of change, and if the observer starts by looking at the Argentine diplomatic situation at the end of the conflict, June 1982, it is possible to assert that the whole negotiating process helped to improve the situation of the South American country. After having used the force to settle the dispute, having disobeyed United Nations resolutions, having lost the armed conflict, and having the British assert that the dispute was totally solved, Argentina became isolated, or as one analyst noted: a "pariah" state. 74 Less than ten years later, Argentina, under democratic rule, was supported by the United States, negotiated with the UK under the "umbr ella formula," obtained the British acknowledgement that the archipelago was a "disputed territory," and the protection and conservation zone was finally abolished. After reestablishing diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom in 1990, Argentina was not a "pariah state" any more. This new situation enabled President Menem's administration to improve the international position and prestige of Argentina during those early post-cold war years. 75 From the British perspective, they were able to bring the Argentines to the table to discuss other issues than sovereignty. The latter finally accepted reestablished diplomatic relations without discussing sovereignty. However, under the umbrella formula London returned to the ante-bellum situation of recognizing the islands as a disputed territory.
By analyzing the interaction dynamics and the processes of learning and adjustment of the parties and those of the Argentines in particular this research had followed a developmental model. This model assumes that the negotiation process is broader than the actual bargaining or concessions-trading phase only. Rather, the model emphasizes that the outcomes of a negotiation process are neither predetermined nor random, but are the result of a progressive process of "informa tion exchange, learning, social influences, mutual adjustment and joint decision making." 76 First, the Britons and the Argentines met at
Berne with the help of the Swiss. They learned the extent of their irreducible positions. After that event the Americans intervened, and a longer process of negotiations started with the Americans trying a different approach to negotiate with the parties. After two years of interaction, the parties arrived at a principle of commitment to start formal negotiations. For these reasons, "the outcome of a negotiation on an international issue is generally determined through the process itself."
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In sum, this study highlights the importance of the PN process in international negotiations. As the Berne incident shows, when PN is conducted carelessly the final outcome would be complete failure.
This would be the case of what Rothman says happens during traditional preparations for negotiations,
where "agenda -setting discussions are regularly left until the actual start of formal negotiations."
Consequently, this behavior "often leads to negotiation coming to an end before they really begin." 
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This case also illustrate that sometimes, when negotiations reach a point of stalemate, a mediator can help to find a "zone of agreement." When this situation occurs, the degree of involvement and the resources of the mediator are particularly important. Finally, this case confirms the assertions that effective mediation is more a matter of leverage and influence than a matter of impartiality. This study seems to confirm Bercovitch's assertion that mediators success is associated with their capacity to "move things about." 80 
